The Early Days of a Better Nation |
Ken MacLeod's comments. “If these are the early days of a better nation, there must be hope, and a hope of peace is as good as any, and far better than a hollow hoarding greed or the dry lies of an aweless god.”—Graydon Saunders Contact: kenneth dot m dot macleod at gmail dot com Blog-related emails may be quoted unless you ask otherwise.
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Thursday, November 10, 2011
As I mentioned below, I attended and took part in this year's Battle of Ideas, an event I also took part in two years ago. (In case anyone doesn't know: Battle of Ideas is an annual weekend festival of controversy that is itself controversial because of the connections of its organizers, the Institute of Ideas, with a long-disbanded far-left organization and its successors, currently represented by the online current affairs magazine spiked. For a somewhat bemused but balanced liberal account, see Jenny Turner's article in LRB; for a critical conservative appreciation of the group's development, check this article; and if you want the full-on left-wing conspiracy account, PowerBase, SourceWatch, and LobbyWatch will keep you entertained for hours.) For me, a highlight of the weekend was a discussion on mind-body dualism, featuring Raymond Tallis, Richard Swinburne, Stuart Darbyshire and Martha Robinson, and chaired by Sandy Starr. My initial sympathies in the debate were with Martha Robinson, a neuroscience PhD student and naive mechanical materialist, up against: a polymathic professor and self-professed neurosceptic; a distinguished philosopher of religion (defending, in this instance, the soul rather than God); and two dialectical materialists. (Derbyshire and Starr are both frequent contributors to spiked.) Just to confuse matters, Stuart Derbyshire referred disparagingly to Martha Robinson's view as 'materialism', while himself elaborating (as I pointed out from the floor, to no avail) a materialist view. His contribution went like this: Consciousness is not a separate substance, but neither is it a product simply of the brain. The brain is necessary for it, but looking for consciousness in the brain is like looking for sunshine in a cucumber. In individual human development, consciousness arises from and goes beyond the infant's natural mental endowment when the infant learns language. Language liberates consciousness from elementary mental functions, allowing the use of abstraction and symbol rather than simple stimuli. Mind arises within a social process, originally in the interaction of the infant and its care-givers, and subsequently broadening out to include the whole of society. You didn't work out the Periodic Table, but you know it; likewise much else that's in your head. Not many of us, after all, coin new words, at least not words that come into general use. In a sense, your conscious experience doesn't belong to you, and that's why consciousness seems ghostly and weird. I didn't agree with this at all, or even understand it, but while heading for King's Cross on the Tube the following day I was thinking it over while idly observing my fellow passengers reading or talking or staring into space and it clicked. Consciousness is social, it's uniquely human, it's not just going on in our separate heads but between them, in our interactions. But ... wait a minute ... if that's the case then ... social consciousness is really important. And it changes - and can be changed by - every individual. Ideas matter. Uh-oh. When I got home I checked out the recommended reading for the event, and found right at the end a link to a work of Soviet psychology, and from that a whole archive of links to the works of Vygotsky and the school of thought he founded and the astonishing and inspiring humane applications that it led to, and the terrible vicissitudes of this school of psychology before and after it made its way to the West. Strangely enough, the very same view of consciousness that Vygotsky pioneered and that I heard Stuart Derbyshire outline can be found in all the boring Brezhnev-era textbooks of dialectical materialism. By what a frail aqueduct did the fallen empire convey to a future civilization that most surprising discovery of Marxism-Leninism: the individual human consciousness, the soul! Labels: libertarian, Marxism 29 Comments:Also, Cosma on Vygotsky.
Grudgingly, I admit that the view of human consciousness discussed here:
Chuckie K: I suppose had encountered this before, in the sense that I'd heard of Vygotsky and had read various articles on spiked (mostly on animal and abortion issues) by Stuart Derbyshire and others that take it for granted. But I'd never made the connection before, or realised that it was far more widely held.
Ummm, Ken, maybe I've missed something over the years, but I was under the impression, after reading your earlier books, that you had noticed that ideas matter. Why else do people do things, good and bad, or end up with different social systems? (New mars and old earth and what happens after the destruction of the intelligences of Jupiter) I do hope you're exercising your literary and poetical skills here, and being slightly ironic. It's very easy to "find the soul" by redefining the word "soul". Oh, look, I found two of them on my bedroom floor just now. Time to get the hoover out, I think. Just for the record, I'll pint out that there is an analogous, but not systematic approadch to mind in the work of Geoffrey Bateson. It is the taking LSD in Hawaii in the 60s version. But with less emphasis on social interaction and more on interaction with physical surroundings.
Chuckie is spot-on. Here are more details. A mangled version of Vygotsky's book was published by MIT Press in the 1960s. The Press demanded the excision of almost all historical, philosophical, and Marxist content. The firm felt that no anglophone scientist would be interested. Thanks to this, the full theory of mind and language was lost to us. To make matters worse, the published material was heavily criticised by Jerry Fodor, a prominent psychologist and philosopher. Interest was virtually eliminated.
I recently came across a claim that much of the current psychological science was based on American researchers studying American college students.
Does anyone know whether there have been any studies of children brought up with extremely little human contact, examining what sort of conciousness they develop? If they are obviously concious, then this makes conciousness itself much more likely the product of a single brain. Check out some of the links at the end of the post, on the education of deaf-blind children. Mikhailov examines their implications here.
I think Guthrie's on the money. I was in a Problems of Philosophy and Methodology class once with an ex-RCP organiser who agreed with me that the mind is just the brain; when asked by the tutor how beauty and love fitted in to his view he replied that it is what makes those things truly remarkable that they grow out of purely mechanical operations.
Skidmarx - I guess I should have replied to Guthrie, because I don't disagree with much of what he says, as far as it goes. Consciousness is an activity of the human brain, yes, but that doesn't get us quite all the way. For a start, language is intrinsically social, and it is necessary for human consciousness.
I'm sorry if that came across as derisive. Simply saying that the mind arises, emerges, etc from the brain, yields a basic problem that was discovered in 1926. Ask what it means. Assume one has causal relations from brain to mind. What about causal relations from mind to brain? If they cannot exist, we get epiphenomenalism, the notion that the mental cannot effect the physical. This seems wrong to many. So assume bidirectional causality. Then there's trouble, for it's possible that one theory exists that describes one world with both causal directions. If so, then if all causation is physical, we have reductionism. This seems to force a choice between epiphenomenalism and reductionism. If both are wrong, a solution to the mind-body problem might well require reference to the sociality of an embodied brain. There are other issues here, but this is the deepest (and unsolved) one.
I tend to think that the mind is the brain, that mental processes are physical ones, even if we may be unable to measure them. So I think the problems of the interaction of the two are irrelevant if my view is correct, though I'm sure there may be other problems with it. @Skidmarx This problem does not assume that the mind and body are two different entities. They can be two aspects of one process in the brain, since processes can have causal relations in them. This is one sense in which the mind is the brain. I think it is what you mean. There are others.
skidmarx: The closest I ever got to official Soviet dialectics was Vol.1 of Maurice Cornforth on Dialectics. I was distinctly unimpressed with it.
Without actually getting into discussing the comments, a new aphorism occurred to me on reading your post: "looking for consciousness in the brain is like looking for Windows 7 in the individual transistors of an Intel CPU core". @Charlie. Leinbiz made one form of your point in the 17th century, in his 'The Monadology.' In its part 17 he wrote this: '...perception and that which depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions. And supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception....'
Leibniz followed this with a solution, stated in terms of his peculiar philosophy. 'Thus it is in a simple substance, and not in a compound or in a machine, that perception must be sought for. Further, nothing but this (namely, perceptions and their changes) can be found in a simple substance. It is also in this alone that all the internal activities of simple substances can consist.' @Ken I just had a chance to look at the archival material you linked to. It is wonderful. I will tell some colleagues and friends about it.
Led me to
I haven't finished reading it but I picked up Lektorsky's Subject, Object, Cognition recently and it seems to be in a similar vein, but coming in from the philosophical side (starting with a critical look at things like phenomenology).
Neuberg - I agree with all of that! MORE Progress Publishers books can go online, all that's needed is donations to cover my living expenses. Email the webmaster @Leninist(dot)Biz if you have $$ to donate. ROBERT
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I am surprised to hear you had never encountered this materialist psychology before. I even brought up activity theory here in the comments once. If I had realized it was so unfamiliar, I would have expatiated more.
I'm surprised because in grad school I came across it from fourdifferent sources within a short period of time. In the late 7os into the 80s the literary theories of Bakhtin enjoyed popularity in U.S. literature departments, and the psychological theories of Voloshinov, more or less associated with Bakhtin, lead right to Vygotsky.
At the same time, linguists and social scientists dissatisfied with structural description of language and interested in language in interaction were looking for alternatives to the action based theories of pragmatics associated with Austin and Searle. For some German linguists, activity theory transmitted via the GDR was a ready and attractive model.
A similar reorientation to social use took place in semiotics in the U.S. Wertsch introduced activity theory into this discussion.
Finally, foreign language pedagogy absorbed a broader pedagogical trend to interactional, activity based learning, and Cole's advocacy of activity theory played a major role in this trend.
So the school of Soviet psychology had an impact on every area in which I was researching and working.
For thirty years and more from my perspective it's been everywhere. Obviously it's not, but it should be. Glad it's found another advocate.
By Chuckie K, at Thursday, November 10, 2011 9:39:00 pm